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am very happy to welcome you this morning to our 
conference “Fiscal Policy in an Era of Surpluses: Economic 
and Financial Implications.” It is gratifying that so many 
distinguished scholars, policymakers, and market participants 
have taken the time to attend at this very busy time of the 
year—and century! 
Our topic today is federal fiscal policy and the market for 
U.S. Treasury debt. Only a few years ago, a conference such as 
this would have been devoted to the problems associated with 
large deficits and mounting debt. As recently as fiscal year 1992, 
the federal deficit was $290 billion—nearly 5 percent of GDP—
and the stock of debt held by the public was fast approaching 
50 percent of GDP. The prospect of “deficits as far as the eye 
can see” kept policymakers searching for ways to slow the 
growth of spending and increase the growth of receipts while 
the financial markets struggled to absorb a stream of massive 
new Treasury debt issues.
Over the past several years of surprisingly strong real growth 
and low inflation, our fiscal situation has improved 
dramatically. In the fiscal year just ended, federal receipts 
exceeded outlays by $123 billion (0.8 percent of GDP). This 
achievement came on the heels of a $70 billion surplus the 
previous year, giving the country its first two consecutive 
surpluses since the late 1950s. Moreover, under consensus 
projections, surpluses will continue to rise over the next 
decade. Accordingly, policymakers today debate the wisest use 
of this bounty while financial markets learn to cope with a 
rapidly shrinking supply of new issues of Treasury debt.
In the less prosperous years of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
research interest in fiscal policy and the debt market centered 
on objectives such as containing the explosive growth of the 
federal health care programs, ensuring the long-term viability 
of Social Security, identifying the optimal tax structure for 
long-term growth and well-being, and extracting information 
from the shape of the Treasury yield curve. Of course, these 
remain topics of vital interest. But to our mind, the dramatic 
improvement of our fiscal balance has shifted the spotlight to 
the topics we will be dealing with today:
• First, how did we come to the very enviable situation in 
which we find ourselves? Has it been the result of 
brilliant policymaking, or simply good luck? This year, 
which marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
Congressional Budget Act, is a good time to review how 
the budget process has evolved over the past twenty-five 
years and to assess how well it has worked.
• How has the interaction between the budget and the 
economy changed? More specifically, how do we 
measure the stance of fiscal policy? Years ago, we talked 
about the full-employment balance as a guide to the 
government’s effect on the economy. However, both the 
outlay and the receipt sides of the budget have changed 
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grown as a share of the budget while discretionary 
spending and net interest have declined. On the revenue 
side, payroll taxes and taxes on capital gains have grown 
in importance.
• How do we measure the full-employment balance when 
a very large portion of federal spending consists of 
indexed entitlement payments and a significant portion 
of revenues comes from taxes on capital gains? At a time 
when we are more focused on the fundamentals 
required for sustainable long-run economic growth, is 
the full-employment balance still the best measure of 
fiscal impact? 
We at the Federal Reserve have been studying how monetary 
policy should be conducted to achieve and maintain a low-
inflation environment. We see a low-inflation environment as 
the central bank’s major contribution to sustainable long-run 
economic growth. There are important parallel issues for fiscal 
policy as well.
As the federal budget has moved from large deficits to 
surpluses, new issuance of Treasury debt has fallen off quite 
dramatically. For example, from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 
1999, new issuance of Treasury notes and bonds declined by 
nearly one-third. And if the consensus projections turn out to 
be true, or even if they turn out to be optimistic, new issuance 
will decline a great deal further in the near future. In contrast, 
financial markets have come to rely on a plentiful supply of 
newly auctioned “on-the-run” Treasuries to use for trading 
and collateral. What does this mean for our debt management 
policy? Closer to home, what does this mean for management 
of the System Open Market Account?
Furthermore, with this decline in new issuance, will the 
Treasury market lose its special role in the financial system? 
Moreover, what role will the Treasury market play in the price-
discovery process determining the general level of interest 
rates? What changes should we expect in the Treasury market’s 
position as the benchmark against which many fixed-income 
yields are evaluated? Finally, will the Treasury market’s “safe 
haven” role be shared with other markets, or will safety become 
more scarce in the financial system?
The troubled state of financial markets last year following 
the Asian crisis and the Russian default illustrates our concerns. 
Traditionally, financial crises have precipitated a flight to 
quality—credit spreads widen and Treasuries become the 
“market of last resort” as investors seek a safe haven. But a year 
ago, Treasuries were scarce. Volumes in the Treasury market 
thinned and bid-ask spreads ballooned. The price-discovery 
process did not work well, and the uncertainty in the Treasury 
market amplified the troubles in the rest of the financial 
system. Certainly, I do not want to repeat that experience.
Of course, we can say that the best way to avoid repeating it 
is to eliminate the underlying problems, which were not based 
in the U.S. government debt market. However, history has 
shown that episodes of this kind can and do happen. When 
they do, the existence of a liquid market for default-free 
securities is extremely helpful in seeing us through them.
Ironically, the issues we are addressing are, to a great extent, 
by-products of the extremely successful performance of the 
American economy. I believe that to sustain that success, we 
need to make every effort to understand these issues.
We are indeed fortunate to have assembled today an 
esteemed group to consider these issues from a variety of 
perspectives. In looking over the list of conference participants 
and attendees, I am struck by the diversity of our backgrounds 
and interests. We have experts in public finance, 
macroeconomics, and capital markets from universities, the 
Federal Reserve System, scholarly institutes, and the private 
sector. In addition, the group includes public officials from the 
United States and other nations, representatives from 
international agencies, and active participants in the financial 
markets. 
Your presence here confirms the importance of these issues 
in our economy and in our financial markets. I encourage your 
active participation in today’s conference and your continued 
good work in this area.